

**CENTRAL EUROPEAN  
POLITICAL SCIENCE  
REVIEW**

**2017  
Winter**

**Quarterly of Central European Political Science Alliance**

**Volume: 18  
Number: 70**



# C O N T E N T S

<b>Introduction</b>	<b>11</b>
---------------------	-----------

## **THE STATE AND MIGRATION IN CE**

### **In Memory of Prof. Zbigniew Brzezinski (1928-2017)**

<b>Péter Farkas Zárug:</b> In Memory of Zbigniew Brzezinski (1928-2017)	<b>13</b>
--	-----------

<b>Máté Szabó:</b> Comparative Transition to Democracy - Taiwan and Hungary	<b>29</b>
--	-----------

<b>Pál Koudela:</b> Middle Europe - The Concept of Central Europe.	<b>75</b>
---	-----------

<b>András Braun:</b> The Absorption Capacity of the European Union:	<b>103</b>
--	------------

<b>Zoltán Lomnici:</b> Some Note about Migration and Labour Market	<b>135</b>
---	------------

<b>Csaba Cservák:</b> Responsible Government in Europe and in Hungary	<b>141</b>
--	------------

<b>Mirjam Szakács:</b> Geopolitical Aspects of the French Security Policy	<b>165</b>
--	------------

<b>Ferenc Bódi:</b> History of the Migrations in Hungary during the Modern Age	<b>182</b>
---	------------

### **Reports and Conferences**

<b>Approved Small Grants</b> – August 2017 – Bratislava, Slovakia	<b>209</b>
--	------------

<b>Approved Visegrad Grants</b> – June 2017 – Bratislava, Slovakia	<b>219</b>
---	------------

**Visegrad Scholarship Program 2017— List of Approved  
Intra-Visegrad Scholarships** **229**

**7<sup>th</sup> International Conference on Computers  
Communications and Control** Agora University of  
Oradea, Romania Nov. 15, 2017. **239**

**Book Reviews**

**Mark Lilla:** The Once and Future Liberal. After Identity  
Politics – by **József Szájer** **243**

**Sara Petroccia and Edit Fabó:** The Metaconvergent  
Geofusion and the Emerging Hypercitizenship **251**

The Winners of our Age in one Book: **Norbert Csizmadia:**  
Geofusion - Mapping of the 21<sup>th</sup> Century **262**

**Abstracts** **265**

**About the contributors** **269**






## INTRODUCTION

We dedicate this volume to the memory of  
**Prof. Zbigniew Brzezinski**

The editorial staff of the Central European Political Science Review received the notice that **Professor Zbigniew Brzezinski** died at the age of 89, who was already considered for a long time the classic expert of contemporary political science. He was our regular reader. Our Editor-in-chief invited him to the “Ten Years of Freedom in Central Europe” international conference in fall of 2000 and he accepted the invitation as well as gave the opening lecture for the conference. Twelve years ago we invited him again to the “20 Years of Freedom in Central Europe” conference, but due to his health conditions unfortunately he was unable to participate. We will initiate the **CEPSR Vol. 18. No. 70** (The State and Migration in Central Europe) with a small commemorative chapter. We offer this issue to the memory of **Professor Zbigniew Brzezinski**.

**János Simon**  
Editor-in-chief



# **In Memory of Prof. Zbigniew Brzezinski (1928-2017)**

*Péter Farkas Zárug*

## **A Beacon for all Democrats Some subjective notes about the Professor**

### **Introduction**

Zbigniew Brzezinski was born in Poland, he was a Polish-American diplomat and professor of political science, but fundamentally he was a Central European citizen.

I was not even born when Zbigniew Brzezinski had already had enormous effect on the way global questions were interpreted in the US; and he was a living legend, when my former teachers converted to the more marketable business of political science from scientific socialism.

I remember the frenetic experience of meeting him in the Upper House of the Hungarian Parliament. He was the keynote speaker of the conference „10 Years of Freedom”. I was a young assistant professor, and he was the political scientist *par excellence* for me.

### **The 3<sup>rd</sup> or 4<sup>rd</sup> wave of democracies**

Brzezinski delivered a strict verdict on the 10 years we had here in Central and Eastern Europe from 1990 to 2000. He saw what Huntington could not see about the 3<sup>rd</sup> wave of democracies in Central and Eastern Europe, 50 million children starving, and even more living in deep destitution, the brutal side of capitalism, corruption on the state and political level, failing labour market and many other problems – confusing the citizens of these states and

causing them to feel that they had made a bad bargain with the regime change.<sup>1</sup>

Brzezinski detected that most of these societies – implicitly or explicitly – thought that they had made a bad decision when after the collapse of the Soviet Union they chose the democratic way of life with its existential insecurities instead of a well-structured dictatorship with its economic – however basic level - security. This bitter experience – as explained by him to an elated audience causing a moment of silence – meant, that for many millions the experience of freedom was not a positive one, but the cause of insecurity and impoverishment, and for this reason they would welcome a reverse regime change if it could take them back to relative existential security in a society with no freedoms. (Wolfgang Merkel the German political scientist recognised these specificities of the Central and Eastern European societies, and he suggested that they should have been called 4th wave democracies, since the regime changes of 1989-1990 could not be categorized according to the Huntingtonian terms.)<sup>2</sup>

Among the many naive advocates of the liberation narrative – myself included – and among the enthusiastic evangelists of the ‘new democracies’, Brzezinski was the sole realist, whose horizon was on an entirely different level from ours, and who saw the world and Central and Eastern Europe especially from a higher vantage point.

At that time he was beyond the point where he advised the POTUS to start a nuclear war, and he renounced chasing vague ideals and all-too-abstract political hypotheses. He saw structures, tendencies and processes, where we saw fragmented and discontinuous events, and so he was able to influence, solely by expressing his opinion, processes we could not even detect.

With his great republican opponent-and-friend, Henry Kissinger, they certainly were the most influential advisers

on the Western part of the globe. Coming from a migrant family with Polish origins, he was able to reframe modern political science as a practical science (with its multiple features of strategy-making, geopolitical analysis and conflict analysis), and political science became ‘policy making’ in the highest sense.

In 1960 – he was 32 years old – he joined John Fitzgerald Kennedy as advisor in his presidential campaign. In 1961 he became member of the Council on Foreign Relations, and he worked for the State Department’s Strategic Planning Council.

### **Us an international conflict manager**

It is practically unprecedented that almost all – however, mostly Democratic – later presidents asked for his services as advisor on international relations, international conflict management, or as campaign advisor. In 1964 Brzezinski supported Lyndon Johnson’s campaign and his “Great Society” programme, in 1968 he worked in the campaign team of Hubert Humphrey.

In 1968 he became a prominent target of the student protests because of his support for the Vietnam War. In 1971 he spent six months in Japan on a fellowship and two years later in 1973 – on the suggestion of Jimmy Carter - he became a member of the Trilateral Committee. Between 1975 and 1981 he was national security advisor to President Carter, and on many occasions he proved to be the most influential member of the Cabinet, whose word was decisive, almost unquestionable.

In an interview he told the story of a 1979 incident to Charles Gati. On 19<sup>th</sup> of November 1979 he was woken up by his military assistant with the words: “‘Sorry, sir. We are under nuclear attack.’ That kind of wakes you up. I said: ‘Yes? Tell me’ and he says: ‘30 seconds ago, 200 Soviet

missiles have been fired to the United States.’ According to the rules, I had two more minutes to verify this information and then an additional four more minutes to wake up the president, go over the options in the so-called football, get the president’s decision and then initiate the response. So, I said to him: ‘Call me back when you have the information verified,’ and I remember sitting there. It was a strange feeling because I am not some gung-ho hero, physically. When I fly into turbulence, for example, I’d be very nervous. This time I was totally calm. Somehow or another, I knew everybody would be dead in 28 minutes – my wife, my kids, everybody else. If that was the case, I was going to make sure we had lots of company. So I said to him: ‘Make sure the Strategic Air Commands proceeds to take off.’ Then I waited for confirmations. With one minute left I waited for one more confirmation. Bill called back and said: ‘Cancelled. Wrong tapes. It never took place.’ I remember saying to him: ‘Make sure the Strategic Air Command is called back.’”<sup>3</sup>

I would like to stress his sentence: “I was going to make sure we had lots of company”. This encapsulates his whole attitude against the Soviet Empire and its totalitarianism. He trained himself to have this attitude and developed his determination from his youth, and it made him capable of handling such a decision on 19<sup>th</sup> of November, 1979 for four long minutes.

In 1956 – the year of the Hungarian Revolution - Brzezinski wrote his monograph *The Permanent Purge* (Harvard UP, 1956) on the Soviet-Bolshevik regime, in which he used the Arendtian terms of totalitarianism, and then years later he wrote another ground-braking analysis on totalitarianism with his former professor, Carl Joachim Friedrich, under the title *Totalitarian Dictatorship and Autocracy* (Harvard UP, 1965). The definition of totalitarianism

formulated by Brzezinski and Friedrich is still a touchstone of every propaedeutic into political science. Ironically, new wave dictators and illiberal democrats are also using it as providing guidelines to their concentration of political power and political practice.

- Elaborate guiding ideology that everyone needs to identify with, at least passively.
- Single mass party, typically led by a dictator, members of the party need to identify with the guiding ideology.
- System of terror, using such instruments as violence and the secret police.
- Monopoly on weapons.
- Monopoly on the means of communication.
- Central direction and control of the economy.

### **About the Soviet Bloc**

In his 1960 monograph, *The Soviet Bloc: Unity and Conflict* (Harvard UP, 1960) he argued that the Soviet Empire is not monolithic, not by a long shot, but cracks and fault-lines fracture its internal structure, and that after Yugoslavia left the bloc even more countries under Soviet rule want to move away from the Empire. In the book's 1967 edition Brzezinski saw his earlier position reassured, and in an important remark he underlined that the US needs an independent China policy, and needs to see China as an independent part of the bloc. Even more importantly, he formulated the future task of US foreign policy making as "export of democracy", where the US generates more and more tension in dictatorships through 'peaceful engagement'. In his already mentioned book, Charles Gati formulates Brzezinski's starting point with precision: 'If Moscow was competing with the West outside the

Soviet Bloc, Brzezinski seem to be saying, then the West should compete inside the Soviet Bloc.’<sup>4</sup> And his idea developed into the ideology of the export of democracy, with the full range of its civic apparatus of foundations, NGOs and paid media workers and intellectuals.

However, this ideology had a two-faced effect on former totalitarian regimes. The positive side was that in several cases such regimes collapsed almost peacefully, but on the other hand, the so-called peaceful engagement promoted the interests of Western companies and financial institutions in the 3<sup>rd</sup> and 4<sup>th</sup> wave democracies, and the new democratic regimes were not able to represent their own national interests in international institutions. Intellectuals and media workers of the former totalitarian regimes often found later that they had been mere tools of American foreign policy, and their disillusionment was often followed by the revelation that their own actions were determined – and many times manipulated - by the power-politics and geopolitical struggles, without any reference to the higher ideals of philanthropy. For Brzezinski himself such ideals and freedoms were obviously important; however, in his realistic foreign policy those were only tools in the service of a political agenda. The Brzezinski influenced American foreign policy recruited naïve ‘freedom fighters’ in the Eastern bloc to undermine and disrupt the Soviet power-structure in every possible way; however, in the meantime, the USA willingly supported any Latin-American dictators if its momentary interests demanded that way.

Brzezinski bears great responsibility for this political strategy, and for the propaganda or philanthropic disguise of what I call the neoliberal technic of exercising power (with all its positive and many negative effects). It will be an interesting challenge for future generations of historians to determine – *sine ira et studio* – what kind of role he played

in the formulation of the Helsinki Accords, in the election of Pope John Paul II, in the negotiations of the Camp David Accords, and so on. And in terms of the US-China relations it is most probable that he was right concerning their argument with Cyrus Vance, and it is beneficial for all of us that the US built a stronger and closer relationship with China.

Brzezinski was the one who suggested the arming of the Afghan Mujahedeen against the Soviet invasion. We all know the sequel – Mullah Omar and Osama bin Laden organised a symbolic and deadly strike against the United States. In an interview Brzezinski insisted that it was not his fault, not in the least.<sup>5</sup> In his interpretation it was not the USA, but the Soviet Union, whose aggression radicalized the Mujahedeen. Well, this interpretation is a bit too close to the story of the Hollywood blockbuster, Rambo III, at least for my taste.

His Polish roots have most certainly played some role in Zbig's anti-Soviet and anti-totalitarian sentiments; however, as a liberal democrat, he never really made this transparent. But when he talked about the Soviet Empire he had its continuity with the Russian Empire in the back of his mind, and he never referred to it as a rootless and purely ideological totalitarianism.

It was a surprise for many that Brzezinski became Ronald Reagan's supporter in the 1980s, except for those who knew his determination regarding the fight against the Soviet Union. During the Carter era Brzezinski openly questioned the more conciliatory tone that prominent democrats – and especially Cyrus Vance – promoted in the US-Soviet relations. He won the argument against Vance and remained President Carter's national security adviser, but he was bitterly opposed to the gradual softening of the position of the US against the Soviets. Brzezinski's suggestion

was radically different: the export of democracy through peaceful engagement and a full-blown armaments race.

In light of all this it won't be a surprise that we find 'Zbig' in President Reagan's service from 1985, and that he became member of the President's Chemical Warfare Commission (1985), the Defense Department Commission on Integrated Long-Term Strategy (1987-1988), and the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board (1987-1989). In 1987 he organised Vice-President George Bush's visit to Poland, and after the Reagan era Zbig became an important member of President Bush's team. At this point he insisted that the world-domination of neo-liberalism demanded both arms and an ideology, and he not only found this ideology in his friend Francis Fukuyama's book *The End of History and the Last Man*, but he helped it to have been promoted with millions of US dollars.

This was the moment, when the Soviet bloc collapsed, and Brzezinski may have felt that everything is all right. However, the moment of satisfaction vanished into thin air in a blink of the eye.

### **The international superstar of neo-liberal political science**

He was still the international superstar of neo-liberal political science (and practice); he gave lectures and speeches all over the former Soviet bloc. He was the one who was able to foresee the collapse of the Soviet system, whose expertise was valued by every president irrespective of party affiliation, and who forged the neo-liberal doctrine of armament race *cum* export of democracy.

It is rather shocking, that at that point he became one of the first scholars to realize that this was not the end of history. He saw two main problems.

First, a new form of global society emerged, the so-called

communication society. Second, he also detected the decline of Western domination, as the new democracies of Central and Eastern Europe and the non-Western civilizations of the globe started to challenge Western democracies and the liberal world order. New techniques of imposing power and new fights were needed to preserve the global power of the neo-liberal elites. He never had doubts in this programme, and he was never afraid to start a cultural war to execute it.

As his *The Grand Chessboard: American Primacy and its Geostrategic Imperatives* (Basic Books, 1999) underlined, his hypotheses were based on his prognosis-focused insights about global tendencies and processes. He was a classic social scientist, and he analysed the possible future scenarios according to the logic of challenge and response, and this guarantees that his *Strategic Vision: America and the Crisis of Global Power* (Basic Books, 2013) will be read and re-read for many decades to come.

From his many insights and ideas I would like to highlight only one, the all-too-famous ‘tittytainment’. He came out with this most uncanny idea in a speech he gave at the Fairmont Hotel, San Francisco in 1995, at the State of the World Forum conference. By that time the progression of the Habermasian ‘global communication society’ had become a pervasively clear phenomenon. At the conference – in the presence of Mikhail Gorbachev, George Bush, Margaret Thatcher, Václav Havel, Bill Gates, Ted Turner and many others – something like a consensus was formed around the theory that the formation of a new kind of “20:80 society” is inevitable, where 20 percent of the working age population keeps the world economy going, and the other 80 percent live on some form of welfare and are entertained. Brzezinski invented the term and concept of ‘tittytainment’. He suggested that through the combination of physical and psychological methods people’s frustration and predictable protest should and would be controlled.

The term is a meaning-condensing contamination of ‘titty’ and ‘entertainment’, alluding to the sleepy and lethargic effect that is produced when a baby is breastfed. This story is well documented in Hans Peter Martin and Harald Schumann’s bestselling non-fiction, *The Global Trap* (Zed Book, 1997).

We saw that back in the 1970s and 1980s, in the case of the Soviet Empire, Brzezinski used the theory and practice of exporting democracy as a purely technical term to exercise power, and now we see that in the 1990s, facing the new challenges of Globalization, the theory of tittytainment was also used as a purely technical theoretical device. Brzezinski was not only a realist, but he made an other step, and eliminated the moral categories from his description of the world of politics and power.

The concept of tittytainment goes beyond the ancient principle of “panem et circenses” (meaning: tranquilize the people by feeding them and give them war games to be entertained with). According to Brzezinski, the 80 percent of the working age population who cannot or do not want to participate in the economy, need to be degraded into a dependent relationship with the state and they must be in a dependent state as consumers. This dependency is the only way the possible protests and uprisings can be controlled. Modern media and electronic devices – this is the opium of the 21<sup>st</sup> century, Brzezinski asserted.

To keep the democratic façade for the rule of the 20 percent he offered this double dependency: dependence on the state guaranteed ‘titties’ of social programmes, paid community work and part time jobs on the one hand, while dependence on cheap hobbies and entertainment leading to a controlled state of mind on the other. The more dependent the 80 percent are, the more probable a new – as Brzezinski calls it, neoliberal – world order can be maintained. He

thought that television, internet, porn, videogames, and sports are the most effective devices of tittytainment. Another important version of this is when the media identify the meaning of life with various lifestyle fashions, the fetishism of youth, or the unappeasable longing after externalities. As József Wilhelm, Brzezinski's Hungarian interpreter summarized it rather pessimistically: "The point is, that the 80 percent must entertain and tranquillize themselves with these activities, instead of becoming active members and agents of the system, independent actors of a genuine democracy.

### **As a scholar he was formidable**

The final goal is to make them satisfied with the right to vote in every fourth year, to degrade them into the state of simple vote-machines."<sup>6</sup>

As of today, Brzezinski's vision became reality; however not exactly the way he thought. It is predominantly the emerging illiberal states that embrace the world of tittytainment, but – as we have learnt it from President Trump's campaign and from the emerging world of big-data-politics - the US, and probably all western societies are also turning into a certain kind of controlled democracy. Reality is evaporating, and the dependencies of the majority guarantee unlimited control over them for the 20, or better to say, for the 1-2 percent.

Zbigniew Brzezinski was a personality of historical stature, and as such, historians and social scientists will evaluate his place and role, and his influence on the age. As a scholar he was formidable, a political scientist who saw the tendencies and processes of the world as if from the outside, and at the same time, he participated in the decision-making that shaped and determined these

processes. It would be hard to measure the impact he made on political science.

Most certainly, he was a beacon for all democrats, a great democrat of the 21<sup>st</sup> century, but one who regarded the expansion of democratic values only an “optimal” scenario.

He left the 21<sup>st</sup> century on 26<sup>th</sup> of May, 2017.

## Notes

- 1 Samuel Huntington: *The Third Wave. Democratisation in the Late Twentieth Century*, Oklahoma, 1991.
- 2 Wolfgang Merkel: *Systemtransformation*, Opladen, 1999.
- 3 Charles Gati (ed.): *Zbig: The Strategy and Statecraft of Zbigniew Brzezinski*, Johns Hopkins University Press, 2013, p219.
- 4 Gati, p XXI.
- 5 See Gati 2013.
- 6 Wilhelm, József: A „tittytainment”, 152. szám - 2017 május, <http://www.fokusz.info/index.php?cid=1862959364&aid=1956586381>

## Literature

### **Prof. Zbigniew Brzezinski books:**

- The Permanent Purge, Harvard University Press, 1956.
- Totalitarian dictatorship and Autocracy, Harvard University Press 1965, Reprint 2013.
- The Soviet bloc, Unity and conflicts, Harvard University Press, 1960. Reprint 2013.
- The Grand Chessboard: American Primacy and Its Geostrategic Imperatives, Basic Books, New York, 1999.

**Gati, Charles** (ed.) 2013. Zbig: The Strategy and Statecraft of Zbigniew Brzezinski, Johns Hopkins University Press,

**Gáti, Charles** 2014. ZBIG: Zbigniew Brzezinski, a startéga. Noran Libro Kiadó, Budapest /in Hungarian language/

**Huntington, Samuel** 1991. The Third Wave. Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century. University of Oklahoma Press. Oklahoma

**Martin, H. P. and H. Schuman** 1997. The Global Trap: Globalization and the Assault on Democracy and Prosperity, Zed Books, Paperback

**Merkel, Wolfgang** 1999. Systemtransformation, Eine Einführung in die Theorie und Empirie der Transformationsforschung. Taschenbuch, Opladen,

**Wilhelm József** 2017. A „tittytainment”, Fókusz 152. szám - 2017. május, <http://www.fokusz.info/index.php?cid=1862959364&aid=1956586381>