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Introduction

The **Vol. 20. 75th issue** of the **Central European Political Science Review** treats the topic of the **Future of European Union**. Our aim is to examine from many angles the relationship between the European future and the cleavages in the political life, and the regulations of the conflicts in different part of Central Europe.

The **No. 75 of CEPSR** contains both theoretical and empirical articles as well a international comparative and case studies. Aiming at giving a complex picture, we selected studies from several different countries. We publish papers of internationally good standing authors. Besides we certainly promote young talented researchers in publishing their scientific work.

The main reason for publishing the **CEPSR** is thoughts of Central-Europeanism, the humanism and the democratic values. The emails of the readers point to the fact that during the last 20 years the **Central European Political Science Review** established its professional reputation among the scholars of social sciences.

Our aim is to publish in the **Central European Political Science Review** those political science articles that analyze Central European events, issues and politics. We also welcome conference reports call for papers and book reviews for publication, which focus on Central Europe of have message for the region.

For this way **CEPSR** can contribute to the strengthening of the relationship, understanding and exchange of information between the researchers and intellectuals of our Central European region.

The editor-in-chief

Béla Pokol – János Simon

Sovereignists and Integrationists in the New European Parliament

Chances of the 2019 May European Parliament Elections

The need of Reform in the EU

The European Union is in desperate need of reforming, and action will need to be taken after the EP elections in May 2019. The political party families are more or less in agreement about this, it is only the current leadership (Juncker-Merkel) of the EU who might have doubts (Pöttering 2017; Flores 2018: 43-72). This is apparent even to the American stock market speculator, George Soros, who has been in a close relationship with the current top management of the EU bureaucracy. He highlighted in many of his statements that “The European Union is in an existential crisis. Everything that could go wrong has gone wrong”. (Soros 2018). He uses even stronger words when he also states that “the current leadership of the EU resembles the leadership of the Soviet Union right before its collapse”, and that “reforms need to be started at the heart of the system” (Soros 2019).

Political powers today should agree on one cardinal question before the transformations. The question is the following: What kind of Europe do we want to live in in the first half of the 21st century? (Whitehead 2000). What kind of federal system would be needed for it: decentralised or centralised; a loose confederation of the member states, or rather one confederate state? At the same time, the answers given to the question show the important break line that today divides Europe into states that want to keep their sovereignty, and into states that would hand their powers over to Brussels without question. With a

little simplification we can call one group sovereignists, and the other federalists. Let's take a look at the important differences between sovereignists and federalists. For the sovereignist the EU should be an alliance of free countries, for the intergovernmentalist federalist the EU should be an European United States.

Sovereignists insist on the nations' right to self-determination and on the principle, which is strengthening democracy, and which is also declared by the EU, subsidiarity. They highlight the fact that they want to create an alliance, a confederacy of independent states in which each member state keeps its sovereignty and bears every basic condition of statehood. Thus, they want to keep within their control foreign affairs, home affairs, military affairs, legislation, decision-making competences in the field of justice. Furthermore, they insist on national culture, native language and on national symbols (crest, flag, National Anthem, national holidays). During the cooperation, the most important authorities of state sovereignty remain in the member states' orbit. Rather than delegating part of the authorities to Brussels, they cooperate through the MEPs of the elected governments with their politics that is based on reconciliation; with representative, intergovernmental institutions; and with effective procedural rules. The EU 27 mostly works like this today, and sovereignists partly wish to continue the cooperation in this form and frame, but also wish to take back certain competencies from the EU at the same time.

Federalists, however, pursue greater centralisation. As early as 2010, they wanted to take back competencies; but especially after the inauguration of the President of the European Commission Jean-Claude Juncker in 2014. Since then, the forces in Europe that strive for the centralisation of power in Brussels –in other words, for the federalisation

of the federal system— have strengthened. The point of the process can be interpreted the way the Belgian scholar, M.G. Luycks sees it: “Brussels ends the pyramid-scheme and relativises the nation-state.” (Luycks 2018). The collaboration of the socialist and liberal party families of the EU are forming a majority in the EP, and thanks to the joint influence of Juncker and Merkel, they have been gradually taking over the liberal wing of the people’s parties as well (e.g. the German Merkel-line and the Benelux Juncker-line, as well as the Scandinavian liberal people’s parties), so they define the political course line of the EU as well. Almost unnoticed, they have been turning the federal system into a more and more powerful integrational formation.

This process results in fundamental competencies of nation states shifting to Brussels. Such an outcome can be ascribed to the uniform tax policy, the uniform migration policy or the expressed demand for the formation of the uniform legal system. The centralisation aspirations of Brussels bureaucracy is complemented by the German-French axis and the Benelux States, as well as the wish for Western Europe to become “Centre Europe” (C-Eu) where their interests would override those of all of Europe, including those of Central and Southern European countries, whose interests are fundamentally different. In “centre Eu” they want the Central-European countries that joined the EU later to follow the foreign policy that best serves their intentions and interests with slave-like obedience (e.g. in connection with their policy on Russia or China, or with their attitude towards migration). The fact that they want to make majority will binding in places where only unanimous decision was compulsory before shows the strengthening of the dominant role of the C-Eu, and that they are willing to do anything to erase the veto of a country. They work especially hard on the support of migration matters and on

making it compulsory, referring to the solidarity principle. (e.g. the quota system or the compulsory acceptance of the UN migration package).

One of the concomitants of political centralisation in culture is the so-called homogenisation endeavour, during which they not only aspire to impair the authorities of certain countries, but the continuous intention of homogenising the national minority have also arose on various levels as a goal and norm. The Western neo-liberal point of view and principle only protects human rights on an individual, and not on a collective minority level. See for example the verdict of the Venetian Committee, which says that only individual rights are part of human rights, the collective rights are not (e.g. the rights of national or religious minorities), or just very selectively.

The Integration of Independent States or Sovereign States

Opinions are very divided on whether or not the integration of independent states exists. Shall we rather talk about the cooperation of sovereign states? The EU as an integration system is still far from being a federal system, in which the member states lack more than one of their rights and they are delegated to a shared power centre (e.g. they share one army, language, currency, National Anthem, crest etc.).

Undoubtedly, however, there were some unifying provisions on this e.g. in the field of migration policy, tax policy, legal system, educational system and jurisdiction. Moreover, the interests of C-Eu as a pressure group have already appeared in foreign policy as general interests of the EU. So far, these have been successfully fended off by the V4s whenever it had violated their interests. There are several examples of successful federal formations: e.g. the

United States of America, the United Mexican States or the Russian Federation.

The opinion of the president of Russia, who is an outsider of the EU is very informative in this regard. When Putin offered a union to Belarus in February 2019 he: “ tried to question the very concept of independent states in his subsequent remarks. “There are simply no fully independent states in the world. The modern world is a world of interdependence,” the Russian president said. He pointed to the European Union as proof of his assertion. “There, the European Parliament makes more binding decisions for all members than the Supreme Soviet of the USSR once took such decisions for the Union republics. Is it not a dependency?” Putin asked. Putin also suggested that U.S. military deployments in Europe have undermined nation sovereignty there. “Do you think someone from European countries wants U.S. medium-range missiles to appear in Europe?” he asked. “No one wants that. But they sit, they keep quiet. Where is their sovereignty? But apparently they believe that in the ultimate, general calculation, they are interested in such an organization in which they have invested part of their sovereignty,” he said. Lukashenko has an interesting formulation. He is willing to scale back Belarusian independence but not sovereignty. This allows theoretically for a voluntary Russian-Belarusian confederacy.

In the same breath he questions whether Belarusians are ready for it. However historically he has been the main obstacle to such a union. Belarusians never asked for independence. It was foisted upon them by Yeltsin when he dissolved the Soviet Union as a way to topple Gorbachev and take over in Moscow himself. (Russia inside 20-02-2019).

The European Union is still far from the system of a United States of Europe, and most of the states would not even support the creation of such a formation at the moment.

The reason of their resistance is mostly the fear of it being detrimental to their interests. They fear the strong Western pressure, the domination of the so-called “Centre-Europe” (C-Eu), which pushes them to the semi-periphery or forces a subordinated, colonial role on them. Indeed, the colonial mentality of the former great, colonising countries (France, the Netherlands, Germany, Belgium) still haunts us both politics- and economy-wise..

Are those who centralise on the side of democratic Europe?

In our opinion, the concept of concentrating all the power in Brussels to boost the power of the EU is misleading and mistaken (Shedlock 2019). The reason for this error is that the starting point is wrong, meaning that there is a deep-rooted, wrong assumption in the very core of the statement that reality does not confirm (Harsányi 2018). The initial statement that the continuous increase of centralisation would at the same time increase the power of such a complex, democratic integration as Europe, is wrong. Therefore the conclusion that those who want to centralise the power in the hands of the bureaucrats in Brussels – whom nobody had elected– are on the side of Europe, and those who do not are against it is wrong, too (Dennison and Zerka 2019; Shedlock 2019; Zizek 2019). This way of thinking basically creates an implicit conceptual shift and only accepts the federal Europe as a shared Europe, implicitly as well, thus labelling sovereignists, and those who believe in a lower grade of the shared Europe as anti-Europe. There is not a statement more wrong than this, as such a shared Europe was the a priori aim of the Treaty of Rome which formed the European integration. It was only the coup-like decisions of the judges of the European Court of Justice in Luxembourg in 1962-64 (Van Gend en

Loos and Costa v Ennel) that made it take a semi-federal direction. Alec Sweet Stone called these decisions juridical coup d'état in his article in 2012. (See Stone 2007; and Pokol 2019).

According to our standpoint, the centralisation of power in dictatorships can boost the power of the system temporarily, but it increases the resistance against it as well in the long term. The efficiency of the system will eventually be affected by this, and the entire system will become fragile.. A perfect example of this is the story of the Central-European post-communist states (Barnes-Simon 1999; Whitehead 2016). The one-way motion of power in democracies (its centralisation) leads to even bigger problems, as the power centre is not chosen and it can not be held responsible. Therefore, on the one hand the quality of democracy is being damaged and the democracy deficit is increased. While on the other hand the process results in the adaptability and the innovation getting harder, thus making the entire system rigid. On the contrary, the freedom of locality, that is, the independence of the states and the nations, the keeping of autonomy helps the fulfillment of subside, local elements, and so strengthens efficiency and creativity: both of which have been fundamental European values for centuries. Leaders can not take away any authorities without the unanimous will of the states because if they do so, they create a pyramid scheme, just like the Soviet Union did. We of course accept the fact that a general truth-principle in itself is most of the time not enough if without knowing the exact situational circumstances. Anyhow, we find the statement important that the argument about the future of the European Union can be lead astray by those who draw the main break line between the supporters of Europe, and those who are anti-Europe. It is of no surprise that in the case of politicians and political journalists, the approach that can be regarded as the labelling of the opponent is rather common. If the public

opinion research companies that call themselves objective analyse reality, and wrongfully divide the political powers in Europe from this starting point, they will cause an even bigger problem, as they make the objective nature of their research questionable as well (Dennison and Zerka 2019).

All in all, therefore the question is whether we want a confederal Europe (sovereignists) or a federal one (integrationists) on the long run; whether we want for the member states to keep their bigger independence and sovereignty on the short and on the long run as well, or if we would rather be headed towards the direction of a more centralised power in Brussels. The most direct appearance of the break line is shown in the attitude towards the (illegal) migration coming from outside of the EU. We can see it clear as day from all this, that on the next EU elections what is at stake is the kind of Europe we want. The Europe of sovereign countries without illegal migration which builds its future on the support of families, or a centralised one which is basing itself on illegal migration with the help of representatives and bureaucrats of Brussels. This is the strongest cleavage in Europe today, and with that we have already answered the simplified question of what is at stake on the elections.

Let's call this process "The fight for Europe". The first big battle of the fight for Europe will be fought in May 2019 at the European Parliament elections. However, before we discussed that we still need to answer a basic question related to the denomination.

The Two Sides of the Barricade

It can be concluded from all the above that we have to give such a name to the two sides of the cleavage that both sides can accept for themselves, one which does not contain a value or a classification and is in sync with the

actual processes. Who are on the two sides of the barricade? We can state that there is not a generally accepted denomination of the two sides.

There are people who do not accept this cleavage and instead talk about a simplified local-global contrast or a gap between the periphery and the centre. Both approaches have some truth to them, but we do think that they are oversimplified. Knowing that every denomination has some value content, we have to be wary when trying to give names to the two sides of the cleavage that the representatives themselves can accept as well. This is why we avoid using dichotomy pairs that contain such classifications that are humiliating to one, or both of the sides: e.g. nationalists and cosmopolitans, localists and globalists, anti-Europeans and Europeans, etc..., as they can lead to false statements and conclusions as well. (Bershidsky 2019).

The denomination we propose for the two sides of the cleavage: sovereignists and integrationists. The former is for those supporting the member state-friendly approach, the latter is for the Brussels-centralists. The sovereignists are state-friendly who call themselves national sovereignists or patriots, while the federalists call themselves integrationists or union-supporters. There are different ways, different measures and different goals behind these different denominations, and of course their bearers are different power groups and political parties.

However, a denomination with a very negative connotation is circulating, which paradoxically is used by both sides to describe and undermine the other: Anti-Europeanism. Both sides claim that they are the ones wanting a strong Europe, and the other one is destroying it. We do not take away from either of the parties that their intentions are the same, but it is obvious that the roads leading up to it are fundamentally different. Sovereignists say that integrationists are anti-Europe because by supporting the

centralisation and migration, they destroy the Hellenistic-Christian-Jewish-rooted Europe that has culturally uniform traditions. At the same time, the opposing integrationists say that the non-solidary, anti-migration nationalists who rely on national forces are the ones who prevent Europe from being strong. Usually it is the journalists and the politicians who use the term “anti-Europeanism”, but lately some public opinion researcher companies have started to do as well (Dennison and Zerka 2019).

Making matters worse, pro-European parties appear to be falling into the trap laid by these anti-European parties. Across Europe, liberals, Greens, and many left-wing parties are approaching the election as a fight between cosmopolitans and communitarians – between globalism and patriotism. This political framing is more likely to help the insurgent Euroskeptics than anyone else (Leonard 2019).

Naturally, it is not just the governments of the member states who are divided this way, but the political parties within each country as well. In the following, we take a look at the chances of the parties from each support-group to send representatives to the EP in the various countries. So our question is about how the balance of power will play out between the anti-migration sovereignists parties that wish to keep national independence, and the pro-migration integrationists who wish to strengthen the merging of nations?

The Election of EU Representatives in May

The European MEP elections are held in every five years. The last EP elections were held in the period of 22-25 May 2014. The next elections fall between 23-26 May 2019, each member state setting the exact date for themselves.

Previously, the European Parliament elections were held according to the member states’ election rules and

national traditions, but there were shared EU rules as well. In 2015 they uniformed the MEP elections in each member state of the EU with the dual purpose of decreasing the inequalities between the citizens of the different member states, and making the entire system more transparent.

The distribution of the MEPs seats are always determined by the European Union contracts. Countries with bigger populations have more representatives than those with a smaller number, but the latter ones have more MEPs than they should have, according to strict proportionality. This system is based on the principle of “degressive proportionality”. Each member state can elect a given number of MEPs, 705 all together. The number of the delegation of each country can vary from 6 (Malta, Luxembourg, Cyprus) to 96 people (Germany). Because of the departure of the 73 British representatives, MEPs and the Council have agreed to reduce the number of representatives from 751 to 705 from the 2019 elections on. As a result of this reduction, representative seats can be uphold for the Union’s possible future expansion. (e.g. for Serbia and Montenegro).

The Methodology of Research

The battle of ideas in which Europeans are engaged, what kind of Europe we would like have in the near future will continue after the EP election. But the result of the May 2019 contest will largely set the boundaries of this battle for years to come. Generally accepted, that the key battles in May 2019 will take place in the largest countries, mainly in Germany, France, Italy, Poland, and Spain, which collectively account for more than 50% of all EP seats. Nonetheless, preserving a pro-European majority in the EU in the medium and long term will require hampering the rise of nationalists elsewhere, from Romania to Finland.

What kind of trend do the public opinion researches indicate about the power of balance between the party families? In order to be able to answer that, we had collected the public opinion research data of the past few months. In Table 1 we took the situations of 2018: it contains the European party families (party groups) of the time. We did not pay attention, however, to possible later party break-ups, exclusions and newly formed groups. In the Table 1 we take a look at the voter support for certain parties and we publish the data in party families regarding the period between November 2018 and February 2019 (Table 1).

Table 1: The evolution of the preferences of the party families based on public opinion research data (between November 2018 and February 2019)

Source	GUE/ NGL	Greens EFA	S&G	ALDE	EPP	ECR	EFDD	ENF
19-11 2018	52	52	187	68	217	75	41	37
23-12 2018	53	45	136	70	188	43	36	57
02-03 2019	50	43	136	71	190	41	34	59

Source	Far right	Far left
19-11 2018	-	-
23-12 2018	38	3
02-03 2019	42	3

Source (Parlameter 2018 poll; Kantar Research Institute 2019; Nézőpont Intézet).

According to the public opinion research data of certain countries, we took a look at the voter support for certain parties. However, we did not interpret the data in terms of party families, rather in terms of their attitude towards the main cleavage - whether the party in question identifies as a sovereigntist or an integrationist one. (The following data is from the public opinion researches done in the period between November 2018 and February 2019) (See Table 1).

The bad performance of Juncker-era, or after BREXIT would be new Exits?

Indeed, it is essential to describe the probable composition of the future EP for the aim of the present study. However, it is not our primary goal; it is not enough for us. We are looking for the answer to the question of how the power of balance will play out along the most important break line: between the sovereigntists and the integrationists. This approach challenges the framework of the party families, because party preferences in the case of certain parties are crossing each other. Thus, we have to sink right to the parties' level, as we have to group them in terms of their strategic goals, keeping in mind how many representatives they can get to the EP. It is because we have seen that the members of the party families do not have the same attitude towards the centralisation in Brussels, as the break line can be dividing within the same party family as well. The best example of that is the People's Party (PP), where on one side there is a liberal line that supports the centralisation in Brussels strongly, and on the other there is a Christian social (Christian democratic) line that strongly opposes it, and they collide. On the other hand, there are even more examples of the fact that two parties on the two opposing poles of a dichotomous ideological dimension can be on

the same side as well. For example, there are sovereignists in both the right- and the left-wing as well, parties that are strongly attached to the sovereignty of their nation; and there are strong supporters of the centralisation of the EU on both sides, too. This is one of the reasons why we did not start our analysis at the party families' level, but at the preferences of the citizens of certain states.

Most of the experts agree that the EU is in need of a renewal, with new deep reforms. The reasons for BREXIT were not analysed, and only a very few people looked for those responsible in the EU politics, which is a shame as it may be preventable for other states to follow the British lead. Nobody analysed the responsibility of the Juncker-era, and his very bad capacity of conflict management. Could be responsible for the BREXIT the very bad performance of the current leadership of EU bureaucracy? But we do not believe that the sciatica illness of Juncker poses a sufficient explanation to the many failures that had lead to the crisis. There are people who blame the Juncker-Timmermans-Verhofstadt trio, while others blame the Merkel-Macron line, with his legitimisation-deficit. The reasons of crisis are much more deeper and more complex. It is more than likely that we need a longer time, as well as more and deeper analysis to get a clear picture of the root of the problems, and of the reasons and ones responsible for the faulty tactical and strategic steps. The realistic scale is still yet to come.

First take a look at the citizens' support in various countries for their country to remain in the EU, as we think that ever since the BREXIT referendum, this question deserves more attention. Public opinion researches in certain member states show the following picture. We can form the following groups (based on those who refuse to leave) between the member states who want to remain (Table 2).

Table 2: The distribution of those wanting to remain and leave the EU in various countries (Organised in 5 groups)

I. Wanting to remain:

1. **Massive** supporters: remain without any doubts: 81-90%
– Sweden, Ireland, Germany
2. **Mostly** supporting: the majority: 71-80%
– Poland, Spain, Portugal, Denmark, the Netherlands, Belgium
3. Wanting to remain **with smaller minority**: smaller majority is no more than 10-20%: 61-70% of the whole population.
– Hungary, Romania, France, Estonia, Lithuania, Latvia, Finland
4. **Rarely** any remain majority (51-60%)
– Slovakia, Austria, Bulgaria, Croatia, Greece, Cyprus

II. Wanting to leave:

5. The majority wants to **leave** (only 41-50% would want to remain): Czech Republic, Italy.

It is worth noting that in the groups that want to remain massively (category 1 and 2) there are only Western-European countries, which indicates that, at the moment, the countries of the C-Eu feel that they are the biggest winners of integration. On the contrary, the newly joined countries – except for Poland – are in the “smaller” and “rarely” categories (meaning 50-70% in category 3 and category 4). Interestingly, at the same time, it is Poland and Hungary the leaders of the EU want to start infringement procedures against. It is possible that the new leadership of the EU and its big pressure groups will have to re-think a lot of things in this regard as well. We could also

say that in these countries, the proportion of those who have doubts about the EU and who are dissatisfied with it is the highest.

In the cases of the Czech Republic and Italy, those who want to leave because they think they would be better off without the EU are in majority. This warns the leaders of the EU to pay more attention to these countries, and not just because of their political and economic achievements.

The Analysis

When we were calculating the chances of the EP elections, we kept a few things in mind. If we take the British disengagement for a fact, there will be 51 representatives less in the European Parliament. Thus, the number of EP representatives will reduce to 705. The next analysis takes this situation into account, and calculates the probable number of representatives of certain EU member states based on this information.

We had gathered and now analyse the data of the public opinion researches done in various countries between November-December 2018 and January 2019 along the break line we described. We do not publish the probable number of representatives in alphabetic order, but in descending order by number of the countries' representatives (Table 3).

The battle of ideas in which Europeans are engaged, what kind of Europe we would like have in the near future will continue after the EP election. But the result of the May 2019 contest will largely set the boundaries of this battle for years to come. Generally accepted, that the key battles in May 2019 will take place in the largest countries, mainly in Germany, France, Italy, Poland, and Spain, which collectively account for more than 50% of all EP seats. Nonetheless, preserving a pro-European majority

in the EU in the medium and long term will require hampering the rise of nationalists elsewhere, from Romania to Finland. We must highlight that the election forecast we have prepared reflects the preferences of the public in a certain time period, and is based on public opinion researches that have been done six month prior to the elections. Since then, changes happened in the case of several countries, which increase the uncertainty about the outcome of the May elections. Let us take a look at at least the five countries with the most representatives to see where the preferences of the voters are still plastic in their case, and where can bigger changes happen until the EP elections in May. (Tables 3 and 4).

In Germany according to the January 2019 situations, 6 parties have the chance to exceed the 5% and get into the EP. The CDU-CSU is at 29,7%, thus it can obtain 28 representative seats, but it is easily possible to go over 30% which would mean 30 mandates for them. The biggest uncertainty is around the anti-immigration AfD which is at 14,1% at the moment, but public opinion researchers calculate a lot of hidden voters, so in their case this percentage can be higher if the voters feel enough motivation to go and vote.

In France the situation around the parties has been heated for years, the political race is marked by disengagements and crashes, as well as that many successful, new parties have been formed in a short period of time (e.g. Macron's LREM-party, which used to be wildly successful, had partially crashed since). This way, shifts from the current information are still possible in the public opinion researchers' data in the following months until May. The biggest uncertainty is caused by the Yellow vests movement, as even though 70% of the society agrees with it at the moment, we can not be sure if they will run on their

own or will join another party, or if they will get butchered up in the midst of anti-government forces. They have recently omitted the division of the country into eight constituencies, and there will only be one nationwide list on the 2019 EP elections. The 5% threshold to acquire a representative mandate will remain, as well as the 3% threshold to pay back the campaign costs. According to the survey of the IFOP-Fiducial in January 2019, 6 parties would exceed the threshold but without any traditional socialist parties (PS) who are only at around 4% at the moment. French voters pose as one of the greatest sources of uncertainty.

In Italy, 5 parties would get into the ER. We have to note that the Five Star Movement does not consider itself a right-wing party, but is strongly anti-immigration. Its analysts unanimously predict the proceeding of the governing forces, and they feel that it is possible that they will get even stronger until May, to the dismay of the traditional (opposing) parties. The party established by the previous President of the Senate, Pietro Grasso in 2017, which had declined at the end of 2018 due to internal strife, is thought to receive 2,8% of the votes according to the January 2019 survey, which would not mean representative seats due to the 4% threshold. The Italians can surprise us as well, which is not visible yet.

In Spain according to the January 2019 survey, 6 parties have the chance to get in. Among the continuously crashing old Socialist parties in Europe, PSOE is an example that is still standing safely, and according to the January 2019 survey can acquire 15 representative seats with a 22,8% of votes. Vox is an emerging radical, conservative, sovereignist party which strengthens its base of voters month by month. According to the latest survey it stands at 13% and can expect 8 representative seats, but it can get stronger in the future. AR, that is, the Repuclics Now and

the association of left-wing sovereignist clumps includes the Catalanian and Basque left-wing sovereignist clumps, and the party of the Galician national block. They prepare for the 2019 EP elections together with the leadership of Oriol Junqueras. According to the survey they can acquire 3 representative seats with 5,2% of votes. PP seems like a quite uniformed party, it does not belong to the hardcore anti-migration parties, but it is rather possible that this is a tactical state of theirs at the moment and will change later.

In Poland the strongest party is undoubtedly the PiS. The Christian-national ruling party is at 40,2% according to the January survey, thus can acquire 25 representative seats. However, Father Rydzyk's admirer, Professor Miroslav Piotrowski, the leader of the political group behind the radically Christian Radio Maria, which is on the party's radical end had registered a new party called "Real European Movement" to the EP elections in May, and it can take away 2-4% from PiS if they can not agree. SLD – the leftover party of the traditional Socialist forces is at 5,4% according to the January survey, which would mean 3 representative seats for them, but it is easily possible that they will not get in and then the PiS could acquire more mandates (Table 3). At the end of February 2019, six opposing parts had concluded a new electoral alliance (European Coalition with PO, PSL, SLD and some smaller groups). The biggest among them is the Civic Platform (PO) lead by Donald Tusk. In the new alliance, the second strongest is the Polish Peasant Party, which is a member of the European People's Party. The liberal party called Nowoczesna (Modern) belongs to the ALDE fraction as well. From the parties outside of the parliament the social democrat SLD had joined, which belongs to the Socialists. They were joined by two smaller parties from outside of the parliament: the Greens (from the EU's Green Fraction)

and another liberal one, which was established by economist Ryszard Petru last year. Only two bigger opposing parties had been left out of the alliance: the left-central force called Wiosna (Spring), which was established in February but certain public opinion researchers regard it already as one of the most popular Polish parties after the PiS, and the PO, whose leader is an openly homosexual politician; and the opposing party is called Kukiz'15, lead by Pavel Kukiz, which is the only parliamentary force which stands at even further right from the governing PiS. According to the survey, the parties making up the European Coalition could expect similar amount of votes as the PiS.

In Romania the biggest opponent of the governing Socialist party is the PNL (National Liberal Party), which is at 23,5% according to the January survey and can acquire 9 representative seats. Wavering between the national and the liberal course lines it was established from several liberal cusps' fusion and disengagement. It has a stable place in the EP People's Party, even though some of its representatives had disengaged and went back to the liberal ALDE fraction. The support for ALDE is at 9,7% and it seems to be strengthening.

In the Netherlands and Belgium, neither of the parties are able to send more than 5 representatives to the EP. The reason for this is partly the party system, but the preferences of the voters are also very divided and fragmented. The migration between parties does not mean a relevant change on the political palette of the EU.

In the Czech Republic, there are 3 parties emerging from the others, all 3 having a relatively stable support for them. The ANO –national-liberal ruling party, which is at 31,3% according to the January survey and can acquire 9 representative seats. The ODS –sovereignist conservative party, which is at 15,5% according to the January survey

and can acquire 4 representative seats in the EP with the leadership of Jan Zahradil, they are the main organizers of the ECR-fraction. The Pirati –pirate party, which was established in 2009 is a centre-left, liberal party with anti-corruption and modernising programs. It is at 15,3% according to the January survey and can acquire 4 representative seats.

In Hungary, the central-right party alliance called Fidesz-KDNP covers the central political field almost entirely, and it enjoys social support without parallel in Europe. Besides its confident ability to enforce national interest, it realises a very strong social program from supporting families to work related issues. The opposition is fragmented, making and breaking temporary alliances. Recently the alliance of left-wing forces (Socialists, liberals) had announced a cooperation with the anti-Semitic and anti-Gypsy right-wing party Jobbik, which caused great indignation. It seems like that the small parties can send 1, 2 or 3 representatives at the EP at max. The opposition deals with role confusion. It is not able to locate the weak spots in the governing party so a change can not be expected. In Portugal 5 parties can have representatives. The PS, as a traditional socialist party and the central-right conservative party called PSD are in race with each other, but the balance of power has stabilised. According to the January survey the PS at 39% and can acquire 10n representative seats, while the PDS is at 25% and has the chance to acquire 6 seats.

In Sweden the threshold is 4%, and 6 parties have the chance to exceed it. The Social Democrats (S) are confidently at 30,1% according to the January survey, therefore can acquire 6 representative seats. Behind them there are two other forces who can expect 4-4 seats, the radical SD (19%) and the moderate M (17,6%). It is worth mentioning the left-wing V, which is an anti-EU party (7,9%),

the Christian democrats (7,7%) and the Central Party. All three of them can expect 2-2 mandates.

In Greece two big political forces are worthy of special attention. One of them is the ND (New Democrats) that is sitting in the EPP at the moment, lead by Antonis Samaras. It is in a surprisingly good place at 36% and it can expect 9 seats. Its opposition is the governing SYRZIA which is left-oriented at 26%, which means 7 mandates for them. Only smaller changes can be expected until the elections (3.Table).

3.Table: Summarizing picture of the expected division of the EP after May 2019

Countries	Votes in %	Integration-friendly	Member state-friendly		All
		Integralist	Serenest Right-wing	Serenest Left-wing	
Germany					
CDU/CSU	29.7	28			
Grüne	18.5	18			
SPD	14.9	14			
AfD	14.1		14		
FDP	9.0	9			
Linke	9.2	9			
Others	4.3		4		
Together		78	18	-	96
France					
LREM	21.0	24			
RN	23.0		22		
FI	9.5			10	

LP	10.0	10			
DLF	7.5		7		
EÉLV	6.5	6			
Together		40	29	10	79
Italy					
Lega	32.3		29		
5Stella	24.2		23		
PD	17.8	16			
Forza	8.5	8			
Together		24	52	-	76
Spain					
PSOE	22.8	15			
PP	19.5	12			
Citizens	18.2	12			
Podemos	15.6			10	
Vox	13.0		8		
AR	5.2			3	
Together		39	8	13	60
Poland					
PiS	40.2		25		
PO	28.1	17			
PSL	6.6	4			
Kukiz' 15	6.1		3		

SLD	5.4	3			
Together		24	28	-	52
Romania					
PSD	27.5	11			
PNL	23.5	9			
USR	9.7	4			
ALDE	10.2	3			
RMDSZ	7.1		2		
Ro	7.0	2			
PRP	5.0	2			
Together		31	2		33
The Netherland					
VDD	16.2	5			
PVV	12.3		4		
GL	11.2	3			
FVD	9.4		3		
PVDA	8.6	3			
CDA	7.9	2			
PvdD	5.2	2			
D66	7.2	2			
SP	8.1			2	
DENK	3.9	1			
50plus	2,7	1			
CDU	4.7		1		
Together		19	8	2	29

Belgium					
N-VA	18.2		4		
PS	9.1	3			
CD&V	10.3	2			
Groen	8.9	2			
Open VLD	8.5	2			
MR	7.4	2			
Belang	6.5		1		
PTB	4.9			1	
Sp.a	6.3	1			
Ecolo	5.7	1			
cdh	3.9	1			
CSP	0.2	1			
Together		15	5	1	21
Czechia					
ANO	31.3		9		
Pirati	15.3	4			
ODS	15.6		4		
CSSD	6.1	1			
KSCM	6.3			1	
KDU-CSL	5.2	1			
SPD	6.2		1		
Together		6	14	1	21

Portugal					
PS	38.7	10			
PSD	24.7	6			
BE	8,4	2			
CDS-PP	8.3	2			
CDU	7.1			1	
Together		20	-	1	21
Hungary					
Fidesz-KDNP	54.0		14		
Jobbik	13.0		3		
MSZP	11.0	2			
DK	6.0	1			
LMP	5.0	1			
Together		4	17	-	21
Sweden					
S	30.1	6			
M	17.6	4			
SD	19.3	4			
V	7.9			2	
KD	7.7	2			
C	7.3	2			
L	4.2	1			
Together		15	4	2	21

Greece					
ND	36.0	9			
SYRIZA	26.2	7			
KA	7.6	2			
Golden Dawn	8.2	2			
KKE	7.1			1	
Together		20		1	21
Austria					
ÖVP	34.3	7			
SPÖ	26.2	5			
FPÖ	23.0		5		
Neos	7.4	1			
Grüne	5.3	1			
Together		14	5		19
Bulgaria					
Gerb	35.0		7		
BSP	31.6	6			
DSP	7.7	2			
Da	4.3	1			
Patriots	6.0		1		
Together		9	8		17
Finland					
SPD	21.2	4			

KOK	19.5	3			
KESK	16.0	3			
VIHR	13.5	2			
PS	10.0		1		
VAS	9.4			1	
Together		12	1	1	14
Slovakia					
Smer	22.1	4			
Sas	13,3		2		
OĽaNO	10.3		2		
SME	9.0		1		
ĽSNS	8.9		1		
SNS	8.9		1		
KHD	6.9	1			
MOST-Híd	5,2	1			
PS	5.0	1			
Together		7	7		14
Denmark					
S (A)	26.2	5			
Venstre	18.3	3			
DF	17.8		3		
Against EU	9.7		1		
RV	6.8	1			
SF	5.0	1			
Together		10	4	-	14

Ireland					
FG	31.8	5			
FF	27.6	4			
SF	18.2			3	
Labour	5.1	1			
Together		10		3	13
Croatia					
HDZ	35.0	6			
SDP	18.8	3			
Zivi Zid	17.3			2	
Most	7.7	1			
Together		10		2	12
Lithuania					
TS-LKD	26.1	3			
LVZS	21.0	3			
LSDP	11.1	1			
TT	10.7		1		
DP-Labour	6.9			1	
LLRA-KS	5.2			1	
LSDDP	5.0	1			
Together		8	1	2	11
Latvia					
Saskana	27.5	2			
Par	9.1	2			

JKP	13.1	1			
V	6.0	1			
ZZS	9.3	1			
KPV	14.6		1		
Coal Na	9.2		1		
Together		7	2		9
Slovenia					
LMS	17.9	2			
SD	11.1	1			
SDS	24.6		3		
N.SI	7.7		1		
Levica	10.2			1	
Together		3	4	1	8
Estonia					
KE	25.4	2			
RE	23.6	2			
EKRE	20.0		2		
SDE	11.1	1			
Together		5	2		7
Luxembourg					
CSV	28.3	3			
LSAP	17.6	1			
DP	16.9	1			

Greens	15.1	1			
Together		6			6
Malta					
PL	63.3	4			
PN	34.5	2			
Together		6			6
Cyprus					
DISY	33.6	2			
AKEL	23.1			2	
DIKO	15.0	1			
ELAM	6.0		1		
Together		3	1	2	6
Sum		443	219	43	705

All together	Centralisation- Brussels-friendly Integralist	Decentralisation Member state-friendly Souverains	All
705	443	262	705

We edited table 4 relying on table 3, which shows that even though the supporters of centralisation and migration will likely be strong after May as well, their influence will digress. We could say that the sovereigntists influence will grow, but will still be in minority. We previously indicated some uncertainty factor that can bring relevant shifts about. One of the sources is the growing dissatisfaction of the civilians, which is mostly caused by the increasing expenses and burdens that the migrants mean; the other one is the

crime and the uncertainty of the workplace. For example the Danish are taking legal and technical steps towards putting an end to crimes committed by migrants, by building walls if necessary. A lot of people are hiding and do not dare to state their preferences, as it does not line up with the opinion of the mainstream media. The other source of uncertainty are posed by the parties themselves when they word ambivalent messages to the voters, or when the party leaders disengage themselves from their parties due to their inner conflicts and establish new parties even six months before the election (Table 4 and 5).

4. Table: Distribution of Integralist versus Souveranist by countries (in %)

	Integralist	Souveranist	Together
Germany	78	18	96
France	40	39	79
Italy	24	52	76
Spain	39	21	60
Poland	24	28	52
Romania	31	2	33
Holland	19	10	29
Belgium	15	6	21
Czech Republic	6	15	21
Portugal	20	1	21
Hungary	4	17	21
Sweden	15	6	21
Greece	18	3	21
Austria	14	5	19
Bulgaria	9	8	17
Finnland	12	2	14
Slovakia	7	7	14
Danemark	10	4	14
Ireland	10	3	13
Croatia	10	2	12
Lituania	8	3	11
Latvia	7	2	9
Slovenia	3	5	8
Estonia	5	2	7
Luxembourg	6	0	6
Malta	6	0	6
Cyprus	3	3	6
Together	442	262	705

5. Table: Parties with the biggest support in multi-party systems (above 30% Jan 2019)

Country	Party	Political orientation	In %
Hungary	Fidesz-KDNP	Central-right people's party, Christian democrat	51.8
Poland	PiS	Central-right conservative Christian democrat	40.2
Portugal	PS	Left-wing socialist party	38.7
Greece	ND	Left-wing party	36.0
Bulgaria	Gerb	Conservative central-right party	35.0
Croatia	HDZ	Christian-social people's party	35.0
Austria	ÖVP	Central-right people's party, Christian democrat	34.3
Cyprus	DISY	Christian democrat Conservative party	33.6
Italy	Lega	Central-right people's party, radical	32.3
Ireland	FG	Christian democrat Conservative party	31.8
Czech Republic	ANO	Centralist populist party	31.3
Sweden	S	Left-wing party	30.1

(Malta basically has a two-party system, so the support of one of the parties is always above 50%).

Table 6 shows the country with the biggest proportion of people supporting parties that want sovereignty instead of integration. We can see that Hungary is the biggest supporter of sovereignty. It is worth noting that in the first 6 places of the list there are 5 Central-European citizens besides Italy: Hungarians, Czechs, Slovenians, the Polish and Slovaks. The majority of citizens of the V4s unanimously support anti-migration parties. (Table 6).

6. Table: The most souverain countries based on the representatives sent to the EP (according to January 2019 preferences).

Country	Souverainist	Integralist	Proportion
1. Hungary	17	5	3.4
2. Czehia	15	6	2.5
3. Italy	52	24	2.1
4. Slovenia	5	3	1.6
5. Poland	28	24	1.1
6. Slovakia	7	7	1.0
7. Cyprus	3	3	1.0
8. France	39	40	0.9

Table 7 shows the citizens of the most integralists countries, that is, those who sent centralisation supporting representatives to Brussels in the biggest proportion. The Portuguese are at the top of the list, right before the Romanians. The Greek, the Fins, the Luxembourgers, the Maltese and the Croatians are also among the first ones. How can this strong one-sidedness be explained? It is not easy to give a definite answer to this question, but it seems that the common explanation might be that these countries feel like they are in a vulnerable position either because of their sizes (Luxembourg, Malta), or because geographically they are located on the periphery of the EU (Table 7).

7. Table: The most integralist countries based on the representatives sent to the EP (according to January 2019 preferences).

	Integralists	Souverains	Proportion
1. Portugal	20	1	20
2. Romania	31	2	15
3. Greece	18	3	6
4. Finland	12	2	6
5. Luxemburg	6	0	6
6. Malta	6	0	6
7. Croatia	10	2	5

All in all, the federalist-integralist line can expect 443 parliamentary seats in the EU Parliament in May. The non-leftist,

souverains line can expect 219 representatives, why the leftist anti-federalist can count on 43 representatives, so all together souverains can delegate 242 people.

Could be responsible for the BREXIT the very bad performance of the current leadership of EU bureaucracy, very bad capacity of conflict management of Juncker-era? But we do not believe that the sciatica illness of Juncker poses a sufficient explanation to the many failures that had lead to the crisis. There are people who blame the Juncker-Timmermans-Verhofstadt trio, while others blame the Merkel-Macron line, with his legitimation-deficit. The reasons of crisis are much more deeper and more complex. We analysed the cleavages that today divides Europe into states that want to keep their sovereignty (freedom of countries), and into states that would hand their powers over to Brussels (freedom of bürocracy). With a little simplification we can call one group sovereignists-line, and the other federalists-line. This basically indicates the proportion of the opinions regarding migration coming from outside of Europe, as souverains are pro-migration, while souverains are against it. The answers given to migration will define Europe's working culture, economic power, social politics and value system in the long run.

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